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Abstract
Background: Incubators are organizations that support the growth of new and typically technology-based
enterprises, by providing business support services that bring together human and financial capital. Although the
traditional role of incubators has been for economic development, they may also be a useful policy lever to tackle
global health, by fostering the development and delivery of local health innovation.
Given its high disease burden, life sciences incubators hold particular potential for Africa. As the most industrially
advanced African nation, South Africa serves as a litmus test for identifying effective incubator policies. The case
study method was used to illustrate how one such publicly funded incubator founded in 2002, Acorn Technolo-
gies, helped to catalyze local health product innovation.
Discussion: Acorn helped to support twelve biomedical device firms. One of them, Real World Diagnostics, was
founded by a trainee from Acorn’s innovative internship program (Hellfire). It developed rapid strip diagnostic tests
for locally prevalent diseases including schistosomiasis and HIV, and reported $2 million (USD) in revenue in 2009.
Acorn achieved this success by operating as a non-profit virtual incubator with little physical infrastructure. Employ-
ing a virtual model in combination with stringent selection criteria of capital efficiency for clients proved to be
effective in reducing its own fixed costs. Acorn focused on entrepreneurship training and networking, both critical
at an early stage in an environment dominated by multinational biomedical device companies.
Acorn and its clients learned that employing a cross-subsidy business model allowed one to generate royalty rev-
enue through imports to subsidize R&D for local diseases. However, funding constraints and government expecta-
tions for rapid self-sustainability forced Acorn to merge with its sister biotechnology incubator in 2009.
Summary: A key to Acorn’s achievements was identifying entrepreneurs with technologies with health and
economic impact, and providing them with flexible support from an early stage. A virtual organizational model
helped Acorn to focus on supporting entrepreneurs. Governments and funders may wish to consider incubation
strategies that draw from these good practices. With the right policies and business models, incubators have the
potential to generate both health and economic benefits for Africa.
Background
The traditional role of incubators has been economic
development [1], but there have been recent suggestions
that they may be relevant to global health as well [2]. A
growing literature illustrates the potential health benefits
that can accrue from the development and delivery of
locally-fostered innovation, and barriers to achieving
these benefits [3].
As organizations dedicated to fostering early-stage
innovation, incubators might help facilitate the estab-
lishment and growth of new health technology enter-
prises by providing business support services that bring
together a critical mass of human and financial talent.
Innovative African nations may be good candidates for
employing incubators to tackle global health. Moreover,
the potential business opportunity for private sector
healthcare in Africa itself is significant – estimated at
$35 billion by 2016 [4].
As the most industrially advanced country in Africa,
South Africa serves as a litmus test for identifying
good practices for incubating health technology in
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low-resource settings [5,6]. While levels of economic
development are different, South Africa shares with
other African nations similar challenges in balancing
economic development with creating solutions for
local health needs, as well as industry structures domi-
nated by multinationals and export businesses with
generally little private-sector R&D investment. There
exists a stark contrast between the richness of South
Africa’s biomedical research and the rarity of start-up
companies commercializing and translating those
health technologies. (See the introductory paper in this
BMC series for discussion of this contrast in other
African nations.)
In 2001, the South African government established
several publicly funded incubators including Acorn
Technologies to spur the development of life science
ventures to tackle local health problems such as the
HIV/AIDS epidemic [5,6]. Based in Cape Town, Acorn
helped to create several successful biomedical device
companies by operating as a non-profit virtual incubator
with a core management staff of five that focused on
entrepreneurship training without physical infrastruc-
ture. Yet, funding constraints with an annual budget of
only $500 000 USD and government expectations for
rapid self-sustainability led to reduced service offerings,
and an eventual merger with its sister incubator Cape
Biotech Trust in 2009.
We used a case study design. Our analysis is based on
semi-structured interviews with key informants, site vis-
its in South Africa, and literature analysis. We con-
ducted interviews with informed consent of personnel
from Acorn Technologies, Cape Biotech Trust, DISA
Vascular and Real World Diagnostics between October
2007 and June 2009, along with follow-up discussions.
We also analyzed background documents from peer-
reviewed literature, news reports, books, government
and NGO reports, and web sites. Representatives of
Acorn Technologies and some of its investees were
asked to fact-check the case study; the analysis and
interpretation is our own. All quotes are from the inter-
views unless otherwise noted, and with permission. This
study was approved by the Office of Research Ethics of
the University of Toronto.
In this article, we explore the potential of incubators
in the African context through a case study of one
incubator based in South Africa: Acorn Technologies.
We begin by describing Acorn’s formation, business
model and successes, and merger with a sister incuba-
tor, noting key challenges and decision points in the
process. We then analyze the Acorn case as a whole to
suggest lessons learned for supporting early-stage inno-
vation in low resource settings, especially for global
health.
Discussion
Seeding South Africa’s Life Sciences Sector
Based in Cape Town, Acorn was started in 2002 by a
consortium composed of the University of Cape Town,
University of Stellenbosch, Catalyst Innovations (a ven-
ture capital group) and the biomedical device pioneer
DISA Vascular, under the auspices of a joint program
between the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
Department of Science and Technology (DST), and the
European Union (EU). It hoped to ease the challenges of
commercialization by providing business advisory ser-
vices and networks of industry contacts to life sciences
entrepreneurs, with a focus on biomedical devices. (See
Table 1 for a timeline of Acorn Technologies.)
According to Acorn’s CEO Craig Landsberg, the bio-
medical device sector in South Africa is dominated by
multinationals. These firms have pre-established rela-
tionships and distribution channels, which makes it
challenging to find clinicians willing to be involved in
the testing and local development of products. Success
Table 1 History of Acorn Technologies
Year Event
2001 South African government asks a consortium comprising a venture capital firm, a university tech transfer office, a university’s biomedical
engineering department and a successful biomedical device company to start Acorn.
2002 Acorn Technologies is incorporated as a section 21 not-for-profit organization and receives initial grant funding for three years from the
Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Science and Technology and the European Union.South African government releases a set
of recommendations in the report “A National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa” including the creation of biotech incubators
2003 Department of Science and Technology withdraws from Acorn Technologies in order to focus on creating biotechnology regional innovation
incubators, including Cape Biotech Trust
2005 Acorn launches its first and only run of its successful Hellfire internship program to identify potential scientists and train them to be
entrepreneurs. The program closes afterwards due to lack of funding.
2006 Acorn, Cape Biotech Trust and the Medical Research Council sign a memorandum agreeing to work more closely together and form the
“Kopano” partnership to facilitate technology commercialization
2007 Acorn approaches Cape Biotech Trust to discuss merging and secures funding for medical device projects from the Department of Science
and Technology. Merger is completed by the end of the year.
2008 Medical Device Center of Competence is created by the South African government within Cape Biotech Trust to maintain biomedical device
support services
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depends on building strong relationships with physicians
through a sales force and the right distributor – aspects
entrepreneurial scientists are often unfamiliar with.
Acorn aimed to serve as an intermediary between
granting agencies like the Medical Research Council and
late-stage investors such as Cape Biotech Trust (a South
African investor of public funds for life sciences ven-
tures) to help early stage start-ups create business stra-
tegies, register patents and procure funding from other
government and external sources [6]. Rather than try to
provide every service in-house, Acorn operated as a vir-
tual incubator that outsourced business services such as
market analysis and auditing. This allowed Acorn to
focus on its core competency of mentoring entrepre-
neurs and connecting them to the right people or orga-
nizations. Acorn’s virtual model was partly due to
limited funding, but was also a conscious decision to
focus on mentoring early-stage entrepreneurs.
As a non-profit organization, Acorn did not aim to be
self-sustaining financially, but rather to provide the
resources necessary for biomedical device entrepreneurs
to succeed. The overarching goal was to build sustain-
able businesses with innovative technologies with both
financial and local health impact, in line with the man-
date of the DST. In exchange for services, Acorn typi-
cally took either a percentage of royalties or an equity
stake, which ensured self-selection of serious entrepre-
neurs. Any returns on investments were re-invested into
new start-ups.
Finding leads and potential clients
Although Acorn received almost 300 business proposals
from potential scientist-entrepreneurs, it chose only a
small number of high-quality companies to work with,
and dedicated time and effort to ensuring their success.
The majority of Acorn’s leads for projects came from
word-of-mouth and referrals. Acorn lacked the resources
to actively pursue leads, but did have partnerships in
place with local university technology transfer offices.
This led to several projects for developing medical
devices for surgery and infectious disease diagnostics.
However, Acorn also advised service-oriented businesses
for metallurgy, genetic testing, and electronic health
records. See Table 2 for a list of Acorn’s investees.
One such investee, Gknowmix, provided web-based
genetic testing and counselling services to help physicians
and patients manage cardiovascular disease by integrating
clinical, pathological and lifestyle risk factors for a com-
prehensive assessment [6,7]. As of early 2010, Gknowmix
offered two genetic tests for multifactorial conditions –
the Cardiovascular Genescreen and the Wellness Genesc-
reen – priced at roughly 4000 rand each [8].
Sourcing of projects from domestic industry was lim-
ited since manufacturing and distribution of imported
products accounted for most of the local market.
Acorn’s sister incubator Cape Biotech Trust, also
located in Cape Town, outsourced some projects to
Acorn. Engaging researchers directly at local universities
is one strategy Acorn employed to identify more project
leads. In one instance, Acorn collaborated with the Uni-
versity of Stellenbosch to develop biomedical device pro-
jects, including a non-invasive haemoglobin meter, into
working prototypes.
A prominent example of Acorn’s virtual approach to
engaging and identifying researchers was its Hellfire
internship program. Business-oriented internship pro-
grams are rare for scientists. The program identified and
placed promising young scientists into established local
life science firms for a year, with supporting business
skills courses at the University of Stellenbosch. Hellfire
spawned the incubatee Real World Diagnostics, to
which we now turn.
Supporting the development of Real World Diagnostics
Acorn’s emphasis on soft skills and social impact helped
develop its incubatee Real World Diagnostics. One
Table 2 Acorn’s Portfolio of Incubatees
Company Name Type of Company Target Market/Product
Gknowmix Genomics Genetic Testing and Counselling
Biovac Institute (from CBT) Non-Profit Vaccines Vaccines
Pointcare Technologies Biomedical Devices Diagnostics “Lab in Briefcase” for AIDS Therapy and Cardiac Arrest
One Eighty Biomedical Device Consulting Metallurgic Consulting Services for Biomedical Devices
SunBio (from CBT) Molecular Biology 3rd Generation Yeast Strains for Winemaking
Sinapi Biomedical Biomedical Devices Medical Devices for Thoracic Surgery
Real World Diagnostics Biomedical Devices Rapid Diagnostic Strip Tests
Elective Lifestyle Insurance Cosmetic Surgery
Femipap Biomedical Devices Medical Devices for Female Healthcare/Cervix Self-Sampling
Pin Sealer Biomedical Devices Negative Pressure Wound Therapy Device
Smart Surgicals Biomedical Devices Robotic System for Minimal Invasive Surgery
Surgical Consent Medical Informatics Online Consent Form Management
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intern in the Hellfire program, Ashley Uys, improved an
existing test for HIV while simultaneously developing a
new test for schistosomiasis. The host firm, Vision Bio-
tech, allowed Mr Uys to spin off his own company
under the condition that it would be the marketing
agent for Real World’s products in public sector markets
in which Vision did not compete. Vision helped Mr Uys
register the company and develop a business strategy in
2006. At the age of 23, Mr Uys became a CEO.
Real World Diagnostics’ rapid strip tests for HIV,
malaria and other locally endemic diseases were
reported to be cheaper compared to laboratory techni-
ques or machinery, with prices ranging from 3 to 20
rand ($0.36 - $2 USD) as of early 2009.
In starting Real World Diagnostics, the first problem
was cash flow. Generating initial sales in the diagnostics
market was challenging due to competing multinational
companies with established networks of distributors.
At this point, Acorn advised Real World Diagnostics
to import diagnostic products into the local market to
generate revenue for R&D. Real World supplied phar-
macies directly at a national level, and used distributors
to supply hospitals, retail stores and wholesalers. Using
revenue generated from importing products, as well as
lead funding from the government, Real World was able
to develop several new tests for niche markets. Mr Uys
was able to offer these new tests at a cheaper price
because they were manufactured locally at Vision Bio-
tech’s cGMP facility.
As HIV, malaria, and pregnancy tests represent mass
markets based on high volumes and low margins, new
entrants require the ability to produce inexpensively,
along with access to distribution channels which multi-
national firms often already control. To reduce risk and
sustain local health impact, Real World moved beyond
HIV, malaria and other mass market diagnostics to
develop niche, novel diagnostics. Real World reported
that it was collaborating with the University of Cape
Town to develop a test for beak and feather disease, a
contagious and fatal viral disease in birds; South Africa
is one of the biggest parrot export markets in the world.
Another product was a test for EtG (ethyl glucuronide),
a marker for alcohol consumption. Developed through a
joint venture between UK-based Trimega Laboratories
and Real World Diagnostics, the EtG test allows detec-
tion of alcohol consumption for up to 24 hours after
actual consumption [9,10].
Recently, Real World was alleged to have used con-
tacts and science from the joint venture without con-
sent, and was ruled against by the Western Cape High
Court [11]. Despite these challenges, Real World Diag-
nostics had two full-time and ten part-time employees
and reportedly generated revenues of $2 million USD in
2009.
Dealing with political investment horizons
While successes such as Real World established Acorn
as a legitimate resource for early-stage life science entre-
preneurs, the politics of the national ministries threa-
tened its existence. Acorn received its initial funding
from a joint program between the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), Department of Science and Tech-
nology (DST) and the European Union (EU). The pro-
gram spanned a wide variety of industries including
furniture manufacturing incubators. However, in 2003,
the DST withdrew from the program to create its own
set of biotech regional innovation centers including
Cape Biotech Trust – thus creating redundancy and
leaving the DTI, whose key imperative was job creation,
as Acorn’s primary funder. Under the DTI, Acorn was
just one of several incubators, many of which supported
industries where innovations require far shorter time
scales, such as information technology and floriculture.
Acorn’s funder, the DTI, provided only operational
funding and not funds to invest into its clients. Acorn
received only ~5 million rand (~$500 000 USD) in
annual funding [12]. By contrast, the biotech regional
innovation centers established by the DST in 2003 –
including Acorn’s closest ‘rival’ Cape Biotech Trust, also
based in Cape Town – each received approximately 40
million rand (~$4 million USD) per year to invest into
biotech start-ups. Acorn’s CEO Craig Landsberg recalls
that about 3 years into Acorn’s existence, the DTI
started to expect self-sustainability from each of its
incubators. With little understanding of the long time-
frames in the life sciences, and little political incentive
to change that understanding, the DTI reportedly pres-
sured Acorn to generate income from its incubator
activities. This caused a clash between revenue genera-
tion pressures and the reality that life sciences commer-
cialization takes 5 to 12 years to break even. It led to
the closure of the successful Hellfire internship program
that had spawned Real World Diagnostics.
The DTI stated that they would fund Acorn only if it
worked with companies already exporting internation-
ally, which prompted Acorn to temporarily shift from
supporting early-stage projects to supporting entities
that were close to commercialization or already export-
ing internationally. The DTI approach might have
allowed Acorn to become self-sustainable through royal-
ties, but at the loss of its early-stage focus.
Acorn’s CEO Craig Landsberg developed a royalty-
based model for Acorn’s early-stage clients, where it
took a small percentage of revenues. The royalties
allowed Acorn to appease the DTI by demonstrating
some flow of revenue. Landsberg says the second, more
important benefit of the royalty-based model was to
avoid the sense of “terrible self-entitlement” that per-
vades South Africa with regards to government-funded
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services, which were not valued if free. All contracts
with new clients had a royalty set at around 3.5-5% of
revenues for a fixed period of no more than 18 months.
The model allowed flexibility around the timings of
royalty payments, so as not to cash-strain clients, but
nonetheless ensured accountability from entrepreneurs
in meeting royalty payments. Flexible payments were
especially important for firms developing products with
social impact, since often these were products destined
for public health markets where payment and thus rev-
enue was delayed and unpredictable. Acorn’s virtual
model also proved critical under the pressure of self-
sustainability, allowing costs to be reduced by outsour-
cing services such as business plan writing and market
analysis.
Ultimately, Acorn’s funding gap became too large. The
DTI proposed a model where the DTI, the provincial
government, and the incubator’s income would each
cover one third of the operational expenses. The pro-
blem with this model was that provincial governments
reportedly had little political interest in supporting pro-
jects unless they were technologies such as biofuels or
plant biotechnology with clear economic and develop-
ment impact for local communities; it was not clear
how Acorn’s portfolio met these criteria. Another
option, which Acorn contemplated seriously and even-
tually undertook, was to seek national funding from the
DST and merge with Cape Biotech Trust.
Merging with Cape Biotech Trust
At first glance, Cape Biotech and Acorn’s merger
seemed natural given that they happened to have been
established next door to each other in Cape Town. Cape
Biotech had even outsourced incubation work to Acorn
during its earlier days. However, a combination of com-
petition, falling-out between leadership, and concerns
about Acorn’s financial stability led to ceasing of such
partnering. Moreover, Cape Biotech focused on late-
stage companies, while Acorn continued with early-
stage projects. But “the rules of the game were changing,”
as the DTI demanded self-sustainability.
This financial uncertainty caused many researchers
and entrepreneurs to stay away from Acorn’s services.
Since Cape Biotech Trust had already started to put
incubation services in place, Acorn’s board supported
Acorn’s migration from the DTI into the DST by mer-
ging with Cape Biotech.
The value for Acorn was obvious. Although DTI was
supportive of Acorn, DTI’s incubation model – focused
on quota-based job creation, and sustainability over
impact – didn’t fit the life sciences. Since Cape Biotech
Trust did not yet formally have an incubation offering
for its clients, the question was whether more value
would be created for its clients through a merger. Some
concerns involved Cape Biotech’s role as an investment
vehicle as opposed to Acorn’s role as an advisory and
support service, and the fact that Cape Biotech focused
its attention strictly on biotechnology as opposed to
Acorn’s focus on biomedical devices. This meant that
Acorn’s clients were potentially at risk of losing support.
But there was a consensus that the market might be too
small for two organizations.
All of Acorn’s late stage projects were therefore trans-
ferred to Cape Biotech, while Acorn received a period of
12 months of funding at between 30-50% to ensure con-
tinuity of projects that Cape Biotech could not absorb
into its portfolio.
The merger left the fate of the biomedical device cli-
ents uncertain. Fortunately, the DST was in the process
of establishing a number of Centers of Competence.
One of them happened to be a biomedical device center,
which was placed inside the newly merged organization.
Acorn’s staff was hired into this Center. The primary
functions of the new organization were meant to include
skills development, incubation, networking and cluster-
ing. Acorn’s expertise in nurturing early-stage projects
complemented Cape Biotech Trust’s late-stage projects
by creating a pipeline of potential late-stage life sciences
opportunities.
Cape Biotech Trust and the other biotechnology regio-
nal innovation centers, in turn, merged into a national
initiative: the Technology Innovation Agency, which is
expected to scale up to an annual budget of 1 billion
rand ($130M USD) by 2013 [13]. A key function will be
to provide funding for private sector companies to work
with science councils on high-risk, early-stage research
with support from existing incubation staff. The TIA is
also tightly linked to national policy with its own staff
allocated to advocacy and strategic relationships, as well
as funding through grants, soft and convertible loans,
and public-private partnerships.
While Acorn and Cape Biotech Trust no longer exist
in name, many of their personnel and functions are still
active, and their formative experiences have allowed
South Africa to better understand and integrate incuba-
tors into its national innovation strategy.
Lessons learned
The story of Acorn Technologies offers several lessons
for innovation strategies in low-resource settings. Below
we suggest some insights that entrepreneurs, policy
makers, and practitioners may take.
Accept that life sciences may require long time horizons for
commercialization
Incubators need flexibility in supporting early-stage life
sciences ventures, which may require long timeframes
to demonstrate success. In the face of pressure from the
government to generate revenues, Acorn was forced to
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adopt a royalty-based model to demonstrate short-term
focus. While the model bought Acorn additional time to
wait for renewed funding or new opportunities, it was
ultimately forced to merge with Cape Biotech Trust.
Additional funding could have prevented the closure of
the successful Hellfire internship program.
Screen clients stringently, and require evidence of focused
commitment
Although Acorn received hundreds of business propo-
sals from potential scientist-entrepreneurs, it chose only
a small number of high-quality companies to work with,
and dedicated time and effort to ensuring their success.
Part of its selection approach was to insist that entrepre-
neurs agreed to give Acorn a royalty in exchange for
services, so that only serious entrepreneurs would sub-
mit plans.
Stringent screening policies can improve graduation
results, by improving resource allocation and account-
ability. As a point of comparison, Israel although having
very successful enterprises has a low company survival
rate of 53% [14] – its incubators are similar to South
Africa’s in being government funded and non-profit.
Not every discovery warrants its own company.
Enable hands-on entrepreneurial training and support
The experience of Acorn suggests that the importance
of “soft” services such as networking and mentorship
should not be underestimated. In the developing world,
business power is often concentrated in a few incum-
bent firms [15]. Penetrating their stranglehold on distri-
bution channels and human capital requires networking
by entrepreneurs. As most scientists have little business
experience, incubators must take a “hands-on” approach
in developing business strategies or pairing scientists
with entrepreneurs, and training both in marketing and
presentation skills.
Acorn was able to provide its incubatees access to
experienced life science entrepreneurs and legal and
financial experts, who could provide services such as
strategic advice, a strong board, fiscal discipline, and
access to networks of connections. Acorn’s internship
and business training programs for scientists keen to
pursue the entrepreneurial route helped create a pipe-
line of potential talent for its start-ups. Indeed, Acorn
helped to identify and train the founder of Real World
Diagnostics, and provided him with the opportunity to
work at Vision Biotech and gain private sector exposure.
Real World Diagnostics, in turn, benefited from Acorn’s
networks in establishing its distribution channels, meet-
ing with international partners, and securing govern-
ment grants. Governments may therefore wish to
consider supporting internship programs such as Hell-
fire which can train scientific entrepreneurs, or partner-
ing with non-profits which can do the same.
Consider a virtual organization model
Acorn’s decision to employ a virtual model and forgo
providing many of its business services in-house stream-
lined the organization’s costs and services, and allowed
it to focus on core competencies of mentorship and
networking.
One question to ask might be, under which conditions
is a virtual model appropriate? South Africa already has
strong research facilities at its universities, so this may
have made specialized physical infrastructure unneces-
sary. This may or may not be true in other developing
nations and emerging economies. In some cases, invest-
ments in physical infrastructure are allocated for pur-
poses other than health product development. In India,
for example, entrepreneurs have complained that physi-
cal biotechnology parks tend to host primarily non-com-
mercial research [16].
If physical infrastructure is unnecessary, the possibility
arises of global incubator networks based on models
such as Endeavor, a non-profit based in New York City
which is dedicated to promoting entrepreneurship in
emerging economies through mentorship and network-
ing [17]. Indeed, one of Acorn’s co-founders – DISA
Vascular, a stent innovator – was able to connect with
local South African hospital CEOs that would have nor-
mally ignored its request, through the Endeavor
network.
Focus on local health impact
Where disease burden is high, governments and funders
gain if they support investments that can improve local
health while being financially successful.
One of the challenges that Acorn faced was convin-
cing the DTI to think beyond traditional metrics and
view social impact as a criterion for success. Acorn
invested in some companies whose products would not
necessarily have high profit margins, but would tackle
contributors to the local high disease burden such as
HIV/AIDS.
One strategy used was a cross-subsidy business model
where selling imported products generated revenue to
subsidize innovative R&D. Real World Diagnostics exe-
cuted this model to develop improved tests for HIV and
schistosomiasis, as well as for alcohol consumption and
beak and feather disease.
Coordinate innovation efforts across different governmental
departments
The lack of coordination between the DTI and the DST
contributed significantly to Acorn’s challenges. This sug-
gests that governments and other partners should con-
sider coordinating innovation efforts to avoid
redundancy and inefficiencies.
Integration of support from early to late-stage func-
tions in a single organization can help increase the
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chances of success by providing critical support and
access to capital throughout the mid to late stage devel-
opment process. It can also provide increased financial
stability for the overall incubation effort, with royalties
generated from late-stage investments that are presum-
ably lower-risk subsidizing early-stage functions such as
internship programs and start-ups. Support and pro-
tected time for early-stage companies is especially
important for life sciences companies whose aim is
health impact.
Summary
Given that South Africa is more industrially advanced
yet faces similar health and commercialization chal-
lenges to other African nations, learning from the chal-
lenges that Acorn faced may be helpful for other
African stakeholders aiming to catalyze innovation rele-
vant to local health problems. Both health and economic
benefits are possible from investing in local health pro-
duct innovation. Incubators may be one such vehicle to
invest in, especially if implemented effectively and in
contexts where sufficient scientific and financial capacity
can be concentrated.
Acorn learned to overcome the challenges of bringing
governmental and public support to the life sciences
industry, and supporting prospective entrepreneurs with
little business experience. The long time frames before
life science companies are profitable made finding a sus-
tainable model difficult, especially given Acorn’s desire
to have both health and financial impact.
Acorn developed an entrepreneur-centric business
model to tackle these issues and achieve its purpose of
helping start-up companies. To fiscally maintain this
model, Acorn ultimately had to reach out to sister orga-
nizations and integrate its services. Employing a virtual
and entrepreneur-centric model in combination with
policies of capital efficiency and stringent screening
proved to be effective in reducing fixed costs, while
simultaneously allowing focus on networking and
mentoring.
The key emphasis was on soft skills. Internship pro-
grams such as Hellfire illustrate how entrepreneurial
scientists can be identified early and trained to grow
companies. Networking was likewise critical in an envir-
onment dominated by multinational biomedical device
companies. Such training programs could be implemen-
ted at relatively low cost in other African countries, but
require engagement of existing firms and experts.
Where the requisite experience does not exist locally,
there may be opportunity for international networking
and mentorship.
Governments might incentivize existing firms to adopt
cross-subsidized import/R&D business models to tackle
local diseases. Finally, African countries with similar
scientific strengths may consider pooling resources
together to create “regional innovation communities”
with incubators as organizing bodies [18]. With the
right policies and business models, incubators have the
potential to generate economic and health benefits for
Africa.
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